C. PAUL ROBINSON (1941-2023)

BY MIRIAM E. JOHN

Ambassador C. PAUL ROBINSON was recognized by the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) for his leadership in the nation’s nuclear weapons program, but that only scratches the surface of his contributions to national security, the integrity with which he served, and the example he set for so many who worked with him and for him.

Paul’s father was temporarily transferred from Detroit to Memphis, Tennessee, to work for Fisher Body during World War II. The move became permanent after the war. Paul was five years old at the time and remained in Memphis through high school and his undergraduate education, attending the small Christian Brothers College. He graduated with a degree in physics but often spoke about his liberal arts education. Not being Catholic, he spent the religion hour reading American novels. He excelled in mathematics, famously solving the “coconut problem,” a classic example of a Diophantine equation in number theory. His solution earned him a cash prize from the Math Club and invitations to give lectures explaining his method. That experience, along with managing and teaching undergraduate labs for two years while still a student himself, shaped a lifelong approach to engaging audiences and teams in tackling complex problems.

His professors at Christian Brothers planted the seeds of his pursuit of a Ph.D. Paul realized he was driven to solve problems and, although he had strong mathematical talent, he chose to focus on experimental physics. A favorite saying of his, paraphrased from a quote he liked, was: “You can’t fudge the data, but you can fudge the theory.” He also liked to point out that “experience is the best teacher, but it charges you the highest tuition.” Timing was on his side. He was recruited by Florida State University (FSU) during a period of heavy investment in state universities aimed at supporting work at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). A summer internship at FSU’s Tandem Van de Graaff labs had already revealed his talent to engage peers and lead them in productive directions. The most difficult challenge in the lab was staffing its 24/7 operations, particularly the midnight to 8 a.m. shift. When a professor asked Paul to take on the issue, he listened to his peers’ complaints and ideas and devised a rotating schedule with nonuniform shifts that better aligned with normal eating and sleeping patterns. Problem solved. Paul later joked that his thesis on alpha scattering on Ca40 was not nearly as important as the work he did — alongside a fellow graduate student — to increase the alpha particle scattering current in the generator 800-fold.

Based on Paul’s work in improving the performance of the Van de Graaff generator, Los Alamos came calling — but it wasn’t a hard sell. He already understood the level of physics being pursued there and wanted to be part of it. Given a choice of assignments and a passion for experimentation, he chose the weapons test group. His technical skills and ability to collaborate on the design of key weapon subsystems quickly advanced him to the role of chief test operator in the control room. He credited that experience with introducing him to systems thinking — an approach that required understanding not only the technical aspects of an experiment but also how to measure results and manage the personalities and biases of his team.

Developing that systems perspective helped Paul in his next assignment, when he was tapped as one of only a few in the entire laboratory to work on advanced concepts, identifying directions for the lab — especially in light of the cessation of above-ground nuclear weapons testing and still-unproven methods for testing underground. The area that excited him most at the time was the growing interest in inertial fusion, which would rely on lasers, not X-rays, to produce the hydrogen-deuterium compression required. Laser technology was still far from capable of reaching the needed energy levels, so Paul spearheaded a vigorous program both internally and in partnership with top universities across the country to develop new capabilities. One major outcome was the development of the first tunable laser spanning the far-infrared (IR) to ultraviolet (UV) spectrum, introducing the possibility of laser-controlled chemistry and laser-induced isotope separation. A new Laser Spectroscopy and Isotope Separation Division was formed, with Paul at its head. One of the division’s most enduring achievements was its ability to produce silicon and germanium at the purity levels required to extend Moore’s law to increasingly smaller feature sizes.

By this time, Paul’s technical and program management credentials at the lab were firmly established. But he had also become known for his strong people skills. So few were surprised, except Paul himself, when he was asked to return to the mainstream weapons program and take the significant step of leading it. The role placed him just below the laboratory director in terms of responsibility. It encompassed not only new weapons development and testing, which had by then moved underground, but also the certification of deployed weapons, oversight of production for new designs, and the lab’s growing technical responsibilities in supporting arms control and treaty verification.

The job placed Paul more prominently in Washington, D.C., where he interfaced with leadership at the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense, and the State Department. He quickly realized that he had to become a student of nuclear deterrence, both theory and practice, and began a journey that would last the rest of his life. He came to be recognized as a deep thinker on all the elements of a strong and credible deterrent: U.S nuclear weapons, the programs supporting the nuclear enterprise, and, most important to his thinking, the people — in government, the military, the labs, and supporting industries. (Of note, Paul testified before Congress a total of 80 times throughout his career.)

Paul closed out his time at Los Alamos when an offer came along at just the right moment. Ready for a new challenge outside the laboratory, he accepted a position as senior vice president, principal scientist, and board member of Ebasco Services, the engineering and design company originally created from the breakup of Thomas Edison’s firm. He was tapped to lead their advanced concepts group — déjà vu — as the company faced new regulations and constraints on nuclear plant design and construction in the wake of the Three Mile Island incident.

He was not at Ebasco long before he was asked to join a high-level advisory group created by the National Security Council (NSC) to assess a simple question; in essence, “Were treaty signatories cheating or not?” At the initial meeting of the panel, members were presented with a draft report prepared by NSC staff. The chairman was prepared to endorse it, as were several others, until Paul spoke up. With his now in-depth knowledge of weapons design, the capabilities of U.S. monitoring and verification technologies, and the potential for hiding or disguising prohibited activities, he convinced the group they needed to dig deeper into the issues. In doing so, he became their translator, explaining complex technical matters in terms they could understand. The group’s findings and recommendations were so compelling that the White House acted immediately on their advice.

Paul’s work with the advisory group did not go unnoticed. Soon he found himself in the office of Secretary of State George Schultz, discussing how to renegotiate the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty — agreements that President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had committed to advancing during their recent home-and-home summits. Although the two countries had first negotiated the two treaties in 1974 and brought them forward for ratification, they had stalled due to verification concerns. With both the technological advances of the 1980s and the thaw in relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the time was finally right to move the treaties forward.

Paul was quickly appointed by President Reagan — and reappointed by President George H.W. Bush — and confirmed by the Senate as the U.S. ambassador and chief negotiator in the summer of 1988. While preparing for negotiations in Geneva, he also took the lead in building confidence with his Soviet counterparts. Given that the chief sticking point in the treaties had been verification of yield, the first major step was the Joint Verification Experiments (JVE), in which a U.S. underground test in Nevada and a Soviet test at Semipalatinsk were jointly monitored by American and Soviet scientists, and measurements compared. The experiments were conducted in 1988, paving the way to finalize the treaty language. As Paul told it, 100-hour workweeks were the norm, but both sides ultimately presented the treaties for signature and ratification by June 1990. Unanimous ratification of both treaties by the U.S. Senate — and the Soviet Duma — followed in December 1990. That Paul personally met with every Senator before the vote to ensure that they understood the treaties and verification protocols was undoubtedly a major factor in achieving such an outcome. The unanimous vote on both sides marked the first of its kind for any treaties with the Soviet Union in the post-World War II era.

Paul later said that joining Sandia after completing his treaty work was the capstone of his career. He had worked closely with Sandia during his time at Los Alamos and had previously been invited by George Dacey (NAE 1973), a former Sandia director and Bell Labs executive, to consider joining Sandia when he left Los Alamos for Ebasco. Paul admired the lab’s “can-do” problem-solving ethos and its engineering creativity, grounded in strong science. In his view, it was the premier national laboratory. So when it came time to make his next move, he knocked on Sandia’s door — and it opened willingly.

His initial position was vice president of systems analysis, which included supporting the newly formed Advanced Concepts Group, a role much like the one he held earlier at Los Alamos. The group was tasked with helping guide the lab’s direction at a time when the entire nuclear enterprise faced an uncertain future due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the cancellation of new nuclear weapons programs. The position gave Paul a broad view of Sandia’s capabilities, as the job required generating ideas that integrated talents and skills across the organization. In addition to helping catalyze new technical initiatives, Paul laid the groundwork for technology transfer and partnerships with the private sector. He established outreach efforts to raise Sandia’s profile beyond the national security community, especially among local and state leaders in New Mexico. His initiatives included public education events on Sandia’s activities, scholarships for technical degrees at the University of New Mexico, the establishment of an industrial park near Sandia, and — perhaps most impactful for securing political support — shifting small business contracting toward qualified New Mexico companies. That goodwill paid off when the state’s congressional delegation helped prevent the closure of Kirtland Air Force Base, which hosted Sandia, and supported the DOE decision not to recompete Sandia’s management contract, a process that has proven highly disruptive at other national laboratories. In retrospect, placing Paul in that position was a strategic move by then-lab director Al Narath (NAE 1987), as it positioned Paul to succeed him. And indeed, he did — in 1995.

During Paul’s tenure as lab director, Sandia established several new programs, including efforts to modernize nuclear weapons design, development, and production (such as incorporating robotics); nonproliferation initiatives that included direct lab-to-lab cooperation and joint projects with Russian counterparts; and support for dismantling many of the former Soviet Union’s weapons. He also expanded work in chemical and biological weapons defense, including the creation of the first engineered handheld micro-chem lab and the decontamination foam later used by U.S. forces during the invasion of Iraq. Additional efforts under his leadership included programs in homeland security, counterterrorism, and expanded intelligence work. The lab’s annual budget grew from $1.3 billion to $2.3 billion, alongside major capital investments in new and renovated office, laboratory, and test facilities. Paul’s leadership was particularly remarkable given the post-Cold War context, when many were questioning the need for continued investment in the nuclear mission and its laboratories.

Not surprisingly, Paul’s success as an ambassador made him a highly sought-after participant in many national forums. He chose to devote his time and energy to those where he felt he could make the greatest contribution. From 1991 to 2005, he chaired the Policy Panel of the Strategic Advisory Group of the U.S. Strategic Command, where nuclear weapons deterrence policy and initiatives were developed. He also joined the inaugural Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, formed alongside the creation of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, serving as one of the senior advisors for programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative — an area where no clear roadmap yet existed. In addition, he served on the advisory board for NASA.

Paul was especially proud to be elected to the NAE in 1998 and became an active member almost immediately. After serving on the Membership Committee, he served as a councillor from 2013 to 2019. His final appointment for the National Academies was on the Committee on Science, Engineering, Medicine, and Public Policy (COSEMPUP) from July 2019 to July 2022.

Among his many public accolades, Paul received the Outstanding Public Service Medal from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for “contributions to strategic forces,” the Smyth Nuclear Statesman Award from the American Nuclear Society for “40 years of contributions to national nuclear efforts,” the American Physical Society’s Pake Prize for “outstanding leadership and research accomplishments,” the New Mexico Governor’s Distinguished Citizen Award, and the DOE Secretary’s Gold Award. He has also served as a trustee of the Kazakhstan Nonproliferation Institute.

Many will attest to Paul’s impact, as well as his spirit and humanity. In the words of just a few:

“He was a polymath and used his enormous God-given talents to help make the world a better place.” — Barbara Robinson, Paul’s widow

“He was a loving father…and also a consummate storyteller with a keen sense of humor and a penchant for telling long jokes from his vast repertoire.” — Paula Robinson-Pradines, daughter

“Through his role at the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories and as ambassador to crucial nuclear testing talks with Russia, Paul was one of the staunchest defenders of American national security.” — Sig Hecker (NAE 1988), former Los Alamos Laboratory director

“Anyone who knew Paul will remember him as an incredibly gracious gentleman with a sharp intellect and a spirit of service.” — Jill Hruby (NAE 2022), former DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration administrator and Sandia Laboratories president

“To Paul, the work came first. But he ultimately was a people person. His personality and warmth inspired thousands at Sandia and around the world. He helped build the culture of exceptional service, integrity, and respect for each other that distinguishes Sandia National Laboratories.” — James Peery, immediate past Sandia Laboratories president

“Paul was an outstanding leader and his passion about the well-being of the nation and its people was abundantly obvious.” — Al Romig (NAE 2003), former executive vice president of Sandia and current executive officer, NAE

“Past presidents of Sandia simply refused to engage the New Mexico community and used security to ignore being members of the community. Paul Robinson…set out on the course of introducing Sandia to the community. Paul had the personality and interest in changing the community's perspective of Sandia. Paul was comfortable with and very good at working with the local political community and was known and respected by the community.” — Jim Tegnelia, former executive vice president of Sandia and former director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

“He brought joy and optimism into the office every day. We had many periods of stress and typically very long hours. He had a wonderful sense of humor with an endless supply of jokes and stories. He was extremely generous with his time. He connected with people at every level. Perhaps it was the statesman or ambassador in him. He was a listener, regardless of the source’s position in our institution. He believed he could learn from everyone. By desire, his evening take-home folders were full of the latest technical briefings and updates.” — Trudy Gosler, Paul’s executive assistant and manager of the Office of the President at Sandia

Any tribute to Paul would be remiss without mentioning what many of us saw as the penultimate example of his leadership, integrity, and professionalism. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) treaty had been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996 and signed by the U.S. on the day it opened for signature. The country had already ceased full-scale nuclear testing based on a unilateral decision by President George H.W. Bush in 1992. The final step was Senate ratification, which the Clinton administration started to pursue near the end of its second term.

The directors of the three U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories were called to testify in an environment where political pressure from the administration to support ratification was high. Two major concerns were at issue. One was the interpretation of “zero-yield,” which for the U.S. meant exactly zero, while for others it meant below the threshold of detectability. The second was whether the newly launched, yet still unproven, Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program — designed to use above-ground test capabilities and advanced physics modeling through high-performance computing — would be a viable long-term substitute for underground nuclear testing. Paul’s testimony¹ spoke clearly to the risks:

The treaty bans any ‘nuclear explosion,’ but unfortunately, compliance with a strict zero-yield requirement is unverifiable...If the United States scrupulously restricts itself to zero yield while other nations may conduct experiments up to the threshold of international delectability, we will be at an intolerable disadvantage. I would advise against accepting limitations that permit such asymmetry. The Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship program though essential for continual certification of the stockpile does not today provide a guarantee of perpetual certifiability.

In advising against ratification without guarantees of several safeguards, Paul understood clearly that his job was on the line — and that public discrediting was likely. Indeed, there were immediate calls for his removal as lab director. He later recounted how, as he left Washington after testifying, thoughts of “life after Sandia” ran through his mind. But when he arrived at his next stop on the West Coast, he received a call from Senator John Warner. Warner assured Paul that his job was intact and that retribution would not be an issue.

To this day, the CTBT has not been ratified by the U.S., despite the nation maintaining its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear testing.

With the passing of Paul Robinson — the country and all of us privileged to have shared even a small part of his life — lost a truly exceptional human being. Yet his legacy continues to inspire many of us to be our better selves.

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¹https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1999_h/991007pr.pdf